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On (not) deserving disadvantage
What kind of diﬀerence does “disability”
make?
Leslie Francis

Disability rights are often characterized as paradoxical. On the one hand,
disability rights are civil rights. As such, they should be rights held by everyone in a given civil society. On the other hand, claims for disability rights, as
well as their instantiation in law, are often categorical: they may only be
claimed by those ﬁtting within the category of “the disabled.”
The ADA illustrates this paradox. It is listed among the U.S. civil rights
statutes. But it is structured to require people to have a characteristic—
“disability,” as the statute deﬁnes—to claim its protections. Seen as categorical, the ADA is then subjected to the criticism that it accords special rights
to people, evoking the problematic reply that the deﬁciencies of their holders
warrant these rights. This reply then places people with disabilities in the
position of needing to show that they are suﬃciently disadvantaged, in a
way that they did not deserve, to claim the beneﬁts accorded by these supposedly special rights.
In this chapter, I attempt to dissolve this paradox. I do so with an account
of disability civil rights in anti-discrimination terms. The account presented
here is based on my work with Anita Silvers; I deeply regret her death and
dedicate this chapter to her memory.
Everyone has civil rights; people do not need to show that they are disadvantaged, deservedly or undeservedly, to claim civil rights. I ﬁrst outline
how as a civil rights statute the ADA protects against discrimination. I then
show that even when the ADA requires accommodation for individuals, it
does so by way of understanding what discrimination is, rather than what
disability is (Silvers and Francis). Key to this point is seeing “disability” and
“discrimination” as deﬁned terms of art.
The ADA protects against discrimination based on disability. Discrimination
is treating people unfairly because of a particular characteristic they have. In
the United States, civil rights statutes prohibit discrimination of some particularly serious kinds, but it is important to recognize that these protections
remain incomplete. At the federal level, civil rights statutes address unfair
treatment based on characteristics such as race, sex, religion, color, national
origin, age, and disability. Many state statutes also address unfair treatment
based on sexual orientation. These characteristics are singled out because
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disadvantageous treatment based on them is pervasive, has been historically
persistent, and has aﬀected the design of social institutions in complex ways
(Eidelson; Silvers, Wasserman & Mahowald, 175–176). Moreover, in these
cases the disadvantageous treatment has been critically associated with devalued status. For disability, Justice Marshall described this history of diminution
and mistreatment powerfully:
Fueled by the rising tide of Social Darwinism, the “science” of eugenics,
and … extreme xenophobia … leading medical authorities and others
began to portray the “feeble-minded” as a “menace to society and civilization … responsible in a large degree for many, if not all, of our social
problems.” A regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation soon
emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled,
the worst excesses of Jim Crow.1
As an anti-discrimination statute, the ADA addresses how discrimination
excludes, both individually and generally. Accommodations respond to individual exclusion: individuals may seek accommodations when their diﬀerences in body or mind require adjustments for them to work successfully,
participate in public services, or experience public accommodations as others
do. Other requirements for modiﬁcations in policies or in the built world,
such as ramps, respond to forms of exclusion that might aﬀect anyone. These
modiﬁcations are better understood not as adjustments in circumstances that
would otherwise exclude individuals, but as responses to both inaccessible
physical structures—structures in the literal sense—and social policies and
institutions that exclude, structures in a more metaphorical sense (Barclay).

The ADA as anti-discrimination
The ADA as enacted began with a statement of ﬁndings and purpose. The
ﬁndings included histories of exclusion, isolation and segregation, discrimination, and disadvantage of people with disabilities.2 As stated in the
original ADA, the ﬁndings also included the observation that “some
43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and
this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older.” This
observation proved an invitation to the courts to narrow the population of
people who could be considered disabled under the ADA. It was removed by
the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008.3
The ADA’s announced statutory purposes were providing a “clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities” and strong and “enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individual with disabilities.” The statute also
asserted the central role of the federal government in enforcing these standards “on behalf of individuals with disabilities.” It invoked sweeping
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authority to “address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
people with disabilities.”4
The ADA then continued with separate sections prohibiting discrimination in employment; prohibiting discrimination in public services, including
a section governing all public services and a special section addressing
public transportation; prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations;
incorporating various miscellaneous provisions; and addressing accessibility
in telecommunications. Some provisions within these sections require
accommodations for particular individuals who need them to work, beneﬁt
from public services, or enjoy public accommodations. Thus it is discrimination for an employer to fail to make “reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualiﬁed individual with a disability” unless the employer can demonstrate undue hardship.5 It is discrimination for a public entity to exclude qualiﬁed individuals
with disabilities from participation in services, programs, or activities.6
Individuals are qualiﬁed if they can meet essential eligibility requirements
with or without reasonable modiﬁcations, removal of architectural or other
barriers, or auxiliary aids and services.7 And it is discrimination for a public
accommodation to fail to provide auxiliary aids and services such as sign
interpretation unless these steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the
accommodation or result in an undue burden.8
These and other provisions mandate accessibility generally. These mandates
do not attach to particular individuals or their diﬀerences but change worlddesign in a manner that augments accessibility for everyone. As just described, the public services section of the ADA requires reasonable program
modiﬁcations and removal of architectural barriers. All public entities operating ﬁxed route transit systems must assure accessibility in all purchases of
new vehicles after 1990.9 Entities operating ﬁxed route systems also must
make paratransit available as a complement.10 Other provisions govern
accessibility of stations and intercity and commuter rail. The ADA’s public
accommodation section speciﬁes that it is discrimination to fail to remove
architectural barriers and communication barriers that are structural in
nature, if removal is “readily achievable.”11 Private sector entities operating
public transit must ensure accessibility on newly-purchased vehicles seating
more than sixteen people, unless they otherwise provide levels of service to
people with disabilities that are equivalent to services provided to individuals
without disabilities.12 New construction is subject to the more stringent
requirement that it be “readily accessible and usable” except where it is
“structurally impracticable” to achieve this goal.13 Finally, several ADA provisions ensure accessible communications. Telecommunications providers
must provide relay services to hearing-impaired and speech-impaired persons.14 Television public service announcements that are federally produced
or funded must include closed captioning.15 None of these provisions are
dependent on requests from particular individuals with disabilities; they help
to ensure a world inclusive of all.
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To summarize, the ADA addresses disability discrimination in two ways. It
requires the world to become more accessible. And it requires individual
accommodations such as auxiliary aids when necessary to avert discriminatory
exclusions of particular individuals. Only the individual accommodations
requirements can reasonably be seen as special rights. Interpreting the ADA as
a statute that only grants special rights is therefore clearly mistaken.

Non-discrimination and accommodations
But what of the accommodation requirements found throughout the ADA?
Does the right to accommodation create a special right and, if so, what kind
of special right? The argument that accommodations create special rights
rests in the idea that only people with disabilities can claim accommodations.
Instead, I argue, the deﬁnition of disability is used as part of an account of
non-discrimination: that non-discrimination requires accommodations to
enable otherwise qualiﬁed individuals to work successfully, participate in
public services, or enjoy public accommodations.
To claim protection from discrimination, individuals must have a disability,
have a record of a disability, or be regarded as having a disability.16 These are
the three prongs of the deﬁnition of disability in the ADA. To claim an actual
disability under the ﬁrst prong, an individual must have an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity.17 Major life activities include important bodily functions and such activities as self-care, manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.18
To claim a record of a disability under the second prong, presumably an individual must have had an impairment of this kind at some time in the past; the
ADA contains no further speciﬁcation of the meaning of this prong. To claim
to be regarded as having a disability, a person must
establish that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under
this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit
a major life activity.19
The condition in question, however, may not be “transitory and minor”;
conditions are “transitory” if they are expected to last for six months or
less.20 An ankle sprain expected to heal within a month would be transitory
in this sense but might not be minor depending on its impact on the individual’s life activities.
The ADAAA speciﬁes that these prongs of the deﬁnition of disability
should be interpreted in favor of broad coverage.21 Episodic conditions are
disabilities even when they are in remission, if they would be disabilities when
they are active.22 Whether a person has an actual disability should be determined without considering any mitigating measures except ordinary

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3836835

48

Leslie Francis

eyeglasses, including medications, assistive devices, accommodations, or individual adaptive strategies for managing the condition.23
Along with broadening the interpretation of “disability,” however, the
ADAAA also speciﬁed that people claiming statutory protection because
they are regarded as disabled do not have rights to accommodation or
modiﬁcation.24 Elizabeth Emens contends that this provision signals that
disability is being treated as a special right: “the ADAAA has conceded
something to the accommodation-is-diﬀerent camp” (21). Emens draws a
similar conclusion from the ADAAA’s prohibition25 of what are called
“reverse discrimination” claims, claims brought by individuals who claim
to have been discriminated against because they don’t have a disability and
didn’t receive an accommodation while people with a disability received an
accommodation. An example of this kind of claim would be somebody
who says they’ve been discriminated against because someone else was
allowed a later starting time for the workday as an accommodation for
chronic fatigue syndrome.
My claim instead is that these provisions were carefully crafted in light of the
goal of non-discrimination. That is, they were crafted artfully for a speciﬁc
purpose. It is discrimination to exclude someone because of an impairment that
signiﬁcantly aﬀects their lives, when they are otherwise qualiﬁed. Likewise, if
reasonable changes or aids could avoid exclusion of people who are otherwise
qualiﬁed, it is discrimination to fail to provide them; this is the point of the
accommodation requirement.
About whether someone regarded as disabled would need accommodations, the ADAAA reasoning was that if someone were mistakenly
believed to have a disability, but did not, there would be no basis for
accommodations. This provision does create the possibility that some
people who need accommodations to function on the job might not qualify for them, because they do not qualify as actually disabled, even when
actual disability is broadly construed. An example might be someone who
has back pain that is not suﬃcient to signiﬁcantly aﬀect a major life
activity, but who needs breaks from lifting in order to manage the pain.
Arguably, however, the conclusion to draw is that the ADAAA did not
address all aspects of disability discrimination, not that the ADA was
designed to create special rights. In support of this conclusion is the
recognition that the ADAAA was a compromise between anti-discrimination advocates and business interests concerned about costs. The result was
a statute that addressed more serious forms of discrimination but left
others out. This is not the same as a statute that singles out a group—the
“disabled”—for special treatment. It is instead a statute that addresses
non-discrimination incompletely.
In what follows, I illustrate these points ﬁrst with the section of the ADA
governing non-discrimination in employment, using the example of pregnancy, and then with a current controversial case involving non-discrimination in public accommodations and waiting times at Walt Disney resorts.
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Employment, accommodations, and pregnancy.
Employers who fail to provide reasonable accommodations for employees
with disabilities discriminate. To claim the accommodation right, employees
must show that they are actually disabled or (possibly) have a record of a
disability. This provision is at the heart of the claim that disability rights are
special rights. After all, many people who are not disabled might ﬁnd
accommodations useful, too. Adjustments in work hours are an example.
People with disabilities may need adjusted schedules in order to perform their
jobs; the ADA requires these adjustments if they are reasonable. Other people
may need adjusted work schedules, too: people with small children or ill parents, for example. However, failure to provide these adjustments is not discrimination, although it may be unjust for other reasons or simply bad policy.
A standard example of adjusted work times as accommodations is an
employee who can no longer work early morning hours or a night shift
because of a disability. According to EEOC guidance, if assigning the
employee hours later in the day does not disrupt the employer’s workﬂow to
the extent that it is an undue hardship for the employer, the accommodation
is required. The EEOC example is a later shift for a day care worker if the
employer has adequate coverage earlier in the day.26 On the other hand, an
employee operating the presses for a newspaper would need to be at work
during the night when the papers are printed. For this employee, the EEOC
says, the only available accommodation would be reassignment to a vacant
position for which the employee is qualiﬁed. The employer would not, however, be required to provide the employee with training to enable the
employee to become qualiﬁed for the vacant position (unless the training is
part of the position), or to create a new job for the employee.
The problem is why these are requirements for non-discrimination when
other desired accommodations are not. New parents might want these reassignments, too. Here’s why these are non-discrimination requirements. They are
responses to exclusion associated with histories of devaluation and mistreatment. Parents of young children have not been systematically excluded in this
way based on parenthood. Compare discrimination on the basis of sex: it is
arguable that women have been systematically excluded from and judged
unworthy of employment because of biological and social features that are
related to sex: women carry pregnancies and may have medical issues associated with them, women breast feed, and at least until recently (and perhaps
even recently) women are primary caregivers for young children. So it is discriminatory to treat women diﬀerently because they are pregnant or likely to
become pregnant in a way that it is not discriminatory to fail to grant accommodations to parents of young children. To say the failure is not discriminatory
is not to say that it is morally acceptable or just; it is only to say that it is not
discrimination addressed through civil rights protections.
Pregnancy poses a particularly complex example of this diﬀerence between
non-discrimination and injustice, however. U.S. law considers disadvantageous
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treatment on the basis of pregnancy discrimination on the basis of sex.27 This
provision, known as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), was added to
the employment discrimination title of the Civil Rights Act after a notorious
holding of the Supreme Court that the failure to cover pregnancy under an
employer’s short term disability policy was not discrimination on the basis of
sex but diﬀerential treatment of pregnant people and non-pregnant people.28
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, of which the PDA is a part, does not explicitly include a right to accommodation for discrimination based on race, sex,
color, or national origin.29 Its assumption is that these characteristics are
completely irrelevant to the ability to perform jobs. Religious beliefs and
practices, however, must be accommodated unless accommodation would be
an undue hardship for the employer.30
In a decision in 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a case in which a
pregnant employee was not granted the accommodation of light duty work
when other employees with similar restrictions were given this accommodation. Peggy Young was a part-time driver for UPS. Her job responsibilities
required her to lift up to 70 pounds. When she became pregnant, she was
instructed not to lift more than 20 pounds during the ﬁrst 20 weeks and not
more than 10 pounds thereafter. She requested to continue to work with a
lifting restriction, but the request was denied; she stayed home without work
during her pregnancy and lost her medical insurance as a result. She claimed
that UPS had violated the PDA by refusing to accommodate her pregnancyrelated lifting restriction although it accommodated similar lifting restrictions
for employees with medical conditions covered by the ADA or employees
with on-the-job injuries. Her position was that if UPS granted accommodations to anyone with a similar lifting restriction, even if the reason was that an
employee had been injured on the job due to undertaking a particularly
hazardous activity, it also had to grant similar pregnancy-related lifting
restrictions. UPS, on the other hand, claimed that it was not discriminating
on the basis of pregnancy but applying a neutral, non-pregnancy-related criterion to determine eligibility for accommodation: whether the condition was
covered by the ADA or the result of an on-the-job injury. The Supreme Court
rejected both of these positions as extreme and held that employers who
refuse to grant accommodations needed by pregnancy while granting similar
accommodations for other reasons must demonstrate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that the employee can demonstrate is not suﬃciently
strong to justify the burden on pregnant women.31 UPS later settled with
Young and now makes accommodations for pregnant women requiring light
duty assignments.32 The upshot is a compromise: pregnant women may claim
accommodations if other workers are given them and the employer does not
have a suﬃciently strong reason for distinguishing pregnancy from its other
grounds for accommodation.
This analysis still places pregnant women in a diﬀerent situation from
people claiming disability discrimination for failure to accommodate, in several important ways. First, the right to claim accommodations is an aspect of
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non-discrimination under the ADA but not under the PDA. Under the PDA,
the right to accommodations depends on parity with the accommodations
given other workers; employers who accommodate no one do not have to
accommodate women who are pregnant. The ADA will not ﬁll the gap for
some pregnant women, because to seek accommodations under the ADA
they will still need to show a condition that substantially limits a major life
activity, albeit broadly construed. Uncomplicated pregnancies, births, and
post-partum needs likely are not covered because it is unlikely that the
employee will be able to show that she has an impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity.33 Second, under the ADA if the employee shows
that she is qualiﬁed to perform the job with a reasonable accommodation, it
is up to the employer to show that the requested accommodation is an undue
hardship. By contrast, under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the PDA,
the employee will need to show that the employer’s reason for rejecting pregnancy accommodations while granting accommodations for others with similar restrictions is insuﬃciently weighty to counter the burden on pregnant
women. The burden of persuasion is on the employee, rather than the
employer. And the analysis is a balance between the employer’s reason and
the burden on the employee.
Consider this illustrative fact situation:
Andrea Mosby-Meacham was an in-house attorney for Memphis Light &
Gas Company. She had telecommuted successfully for several periods of
time in the past and her work did not require appearances in court.
About a year before Mosby-Meacham became pregnant, her new supervisor announced a policy that all employees were expected to be at work
between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m., in order “to set a good example for the
support staﬀ.” The employer had no formal telecommuting policy and
employees often telecommuted successfully, even after the announced
policy. When Mosby-Meacham was 23 weeks pregnant, she required
hospitalization, had surgery, and was placed on modiﬁed bed rest for 10
weeks. She requested to be able to work from home during that period as
an accommodation. The accommodation request was denied, with the
employer claiming that physical presence was an essential function of her
position. So, Mosby-Meacham took sick leave, then family medical leave,
then short-term disability insurance; she returned to work after the 10week period of bed rest. She claimed the failure to accommodate was
disability discrimination; a jury verdict for Mosby-Meacham was
aﬃrmed by the court of appeals.34
In this case, Mosby-Meacham presented her case as disability discrimination
under the ADA. Her employer did not contest her claim to be a person with a
disability. Had she not had the complications that required bedrest, however,
the employer might well have tried to argue that her case did not come under
the ADA. Under the ADA analysis, the question at issue was whether her
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requested accommodations were unreasonable, because personal presence at the
oﬃce was an essential job function or because her telecommuting presented an
undue hardship. With an uncomplicated pregnancy, the analysis would instead
have started with whether the employer permitted other workers to telecommute,
for example to avoid for a period of time the fatigue of commuting when commuting had become especially diﬃcult because of the care needs of an ailing
parent. It would then have considered whether Mosby-Meacham could show
that her employer’s reasons for refusing accommodations to similarly situated
pregnant women who also sought to avoid the fatigue of commuting were
insuﬃciently weighty to outweigh the burden on pregnant women. This showing
might be far more diﬃcult for Mosby-Meacham to make than it would be for
her to contend that her employer had not met the burden of persuasion to
demonstrate that the accommodation would be an undue hardship.
So there is a diﬀerence between uncomplicated pregnancy and disability,
as they are treated under current U.S. civil rights law. Disabled-pregnant
Mosby-Mecham has a better chance at accommodations than pregnant
Mosby-Mecham. The conclusion to draw from this diﬀerence, however,
need not be that people with disabilities get special rights. Rather, it could
be that U.S. law now deﬁnes discrimination to protect the civil rights of
disabled-pregnant Mosby-Mecham but has yet to deﬁne discrimination to
fully protect the civil rights of simply-pregnant Mosby-Mecham.

Public accommodations and waiting in line at Disney theme parks
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation…”35
People may not be denied the opportunity to participate in or beneﬁt from
public accommodations, nor may they be given opportunities to participate
or beneﬁt that are “not equal to that aﬀorded to other individuals.”36 A
speciﬁc prohibition is the
failure to make reasonable modiﬁcations in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modiﬁcations are necessary to aﬀord such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals
with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such
modiﬁcations would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods …37
Another prohibition is the failure to provide needed auxiliary aids or
services, unless doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the
goods provided or result in an undue burden.38
Perhaps the most salient image for special rights giving rise to resentment is
that undeserving people are butting in line (Hochschild). Requests for
accommodations at Walt Disney theme parks present exactly this question.
For many years, people with disabilities attending Disney parks received a
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special pass that enabled them to bypass notoriously long lines. Disney
believed that able-bodied people were abusing the policy by exaggerating their
conditions by hiring people with disabilities to pretend to be family members
visiting the park with them (Hetter). In response, Disney changed the program
rather than require proof of disability status, allegedly because of concerns
about conﬁdentiality.
The replacement program builds on a program called FastPass,” which
Disney originally introduced in 1999 to allow guests to avoid long lines at
particularly popular attractions. Fastpass allows park visitors to schedule
three return time windows for attractions in advance and is included in the
price of a Disneyland ticket. Visitors who use the service can do other things
in the park rather than wait in line, although for popular attractions return
times ﬁll up quickly and there are limits as to when visitors can schedule
additional passes. Disneyland also oﬀers a MaxPass system for an additional
fee which allows unlimited selections of FastPasses. For many visitors, these
options are a meagre response to the frustration of long wait times and the
disappointment of times being sold out for the most popular rides.
For people with cognitive disabilities, Disney augmented FastPass with a
“Disability Access Service” DAS Card. DAS Cards allow visitors to obtain
return times for rides in addition to the FastPass system; return times are not
limited to a particular window but may be used any time after the set time for
return. Visitors may hold only one return time at once; once they have used
their return time, they may select another one that is available, including for
the ride they have just enjoyed.39 Disney also makes additional accommodations available depending on individual service needs.
People with autism claim that the DAS Card system denies them the
opportunity to enjoy the park on terms equal to those aﬀorded other visitors
and is thus discriminatory. Their initial lawsuit advanced two diﬀerent
grounds for their claim. First, they claimed that it was discriminatory to oﬀer
the same program to everyone with cognitive disabilities rather than an
accommodation based on individualized assessments of each person’s needs.
The courts rejected this argument, stating that a one-size-ﬁts-all accommodation did not violate the ADA as long as it accommodated persons with
the most severe disabilities.40 (Parenthetically, the court’s analysis here should
have been as long as it accommodated everyone with disabilities; the court
simply assumed that accommodations for the most severe disabilities would
also be appropriate for less severe disabilities.) Second, they claimed that the
DAS system failed to make the reasonable modiﬁcations needed by many
people with autism. Their argument was that some people with autism have
no sense of time or must follow exact schedules in order to experience the
park without having meltdowns—and thus being able to visit the park in the
same undisturbed manner that non-disabled park visitors enjoy.
In considering this argument, the court noted that the experience of nondisabled visitors is not seamless: they must plan ahead, endure wait times, and
stand in physical lines. Parents of non-disabled children are likely familiar
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with crying, temper tantrums, and general discomforts as well. It is thus not
discrimination to provide people with disabilities an experience that includes
these unpleasantries. A modiﬁcation that eliminated these inconveniences for
people with disabilities but not for others would indeed provide special beneﬁts. However, the claim on behalf of people with autism was not that they
should have a better experience than others. It was that their disabilities are
such that if they are faced with inconveniences such as waits, they would not
be able to enjoy the park to any reasonable extent because of their neurological conditions. Instead of enjoying other attractions while waiting, they
would suﬀer meltdowns. The trial court’s original ruling was that the evidence
was insuﬃcient to support this claim. The appellate court reversed this ruling
and sent the case back to the district court to enable the plaintiﬀs to produce
evidence that more necessary than the DAS Card were modiﬁcations for them
to enjoy the park in a way similar to the experiences of others.41 The trial
court heard evidence in February 2020 but delayed its ruling to allow further
submissions by the parties (Tribune News Service).
This approach, albeit imperfect, is rooted in non-discrimination. It is not discrimination for an amusement park to be crowded, noisy, stiﬂing, or overpriced—although it might be price-gouging, misrepresentation, or cheating of
visitors. Nor is it discrimination for a park to admit so many visitors that opportunities to enjoy the most popular attractions are unavailable to many. It is discrimination if people are unable to have roughly similar experiences based on a
devalued characteristic such as disability. So it is undisputedly discrimination if
people with mobility impairments cannot get on rides because they are built with
steps, but not discrimination if they face the same limits of overcrowding that are
faced by other park visitors. Thus the court was correct to insist that the plaintiﬀs
bring evidence to show that without further modiﬁcations to the program they
would be unable to enjoy the park in a way similar to the enjoyment—or lack
thereof—available to others. Otherwise, the plaintiﬀs’ claim could be regarded as
a request for a special privilege rather than an anti-discrimination right.

Conclusion
Civil rights law as it stands is imperfect. It does not protect against all forms
of discrimination. This imperfection, however, does not show that civil rights
law provides special rights, even when accommodation is required for nondiscrimination. Key to dissolving the paradox with which I began—that disability rights claims appear both to be civil rights claims and special rights
claims—is the recognition of how civil rights claims function. Moreover, civil
rights law is not the same as law for justice. There are many social injustices,
including structural injustices, that are not civil rights violations. The project
of social justice is large and important and civil rights protection is only one
part of it. This observation ﬂags an additional, critical question that I have
not addressed in this contribution, whether civil rights protections should be
prioritized if they conﬂict with other requirements of justice.
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from its disability insurance system violated the Equal Protection Clause.
29 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a).
30 42 U.S.C. §2000e(j).
31 Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 575 U.S. 206 (2015).
32 National Women’s Law Center. 2015. Press Release: UPS Settles Pregnancy
Discrimination Case, Marking the End of Peggy Young’s Nine-Year Legal
Battle. (Oct. ). https://nwlc.org/press-releases/ups-settles-pregnancy-discrimina
tion-case-marking-end-peggy-young%E2%80%99s-nine-year-legal-battle/.
33 See, e.g. Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc.,958 F. Supp.2d 913 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
34 Mosby-Meacham v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, 883 F.3d 595 (6th Cir.
2018).
35 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
36 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)(ii).
37 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
38 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
39 A.L. by and through D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc., 900 F.2d
1270 (11th Cir. 2018).
40 900 F.3d at 1291.
41 900 F.3d at 1298.
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